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LIABILITY OF ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS FOR CON-
STRUCTION SITE ACCIDENTS IN MARYLAND - KRIEGER
V. J.E. GREINER CO.: BACKGROUND AND UNANSWERED
QUESTIONS
HOWARD G. GOLDBERG*
INTRODUCTION
For the past two decades, courts throughout the nation have been
defining and redefining the legal responsibilities of design professionals
- architects and engineers - during the construction process.' Injured
workmen seeking "deep pockets" have been successful in suits against
design professionals, the courts in some jurisdictions having departed
from the traditional tort and contract principles of duty and privity to
impose liability on design professionals for construction site accidents.2
Architects and engineers have become prime targets for such suits
because federal and state workmen's compensation laws prohibit
workers from bringing tort claims against their actual employers or
their "statutory employers,"3 the parties most often directly responsible
for workmen's injuries, and because the compensation provided by such
laws is generally inadequate to make the worker whole. 4
This trend has been based upon the perceived role of the architect or
engineer as representative of the owner, with authority to act as an
* B.A. 1968, Western Maryland College, J.D. 1971, University of Maryland School
of Law. Mr. Goldberg is a partner in the Baltimore firm of Smith, Somerville & Case. He
represented J.E. Greiner Co. in Krieger v. J.E. Greiner Co.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958);
Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1973); Miller v. DeWitt, 37 111. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d
630 (1967); Holt v. A.L. Salzman & Sons, 88 Ill. App. 2d 306, 232 N.E.2d 537 (1967);
Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 Ill. App. 2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584 (1966); Inman v.
Binghamton Hous. Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957).
2. E.g., Broyles v. Brown Eng'r Co., 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963); Inman v.
Binghamton Hous. Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957).
3. Article 101, § 62, of the Annotated Code of Maryland provides that a general
contractor is, for workmen's compensation purposes, the "employer" of the employees of
subcontractors performing work on the contract. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 62 (1979). If
workmen's compensation claims are filed by a subcontractor's employee, the principal
contractor may join the subcontractor as a party to the action; and if he is liable to pay
compensation, he may seek indemnity from the subcontractor. Id. Such provisions are
common. See 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 72.31, at 14-47 n.46 (1976);
text accompanying notes 69 to 76 infra.
4. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, §§ 65.10, 65,20, 65.30 (1976 & Supp. 1978).
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inspector or supervisor,5 but this trend ignores the modification of that
role during the past twenty years.' During that time, the influence of
design professionals has been drastically reduced by, among other
things, the need for professional construction management often necessi-
tated by the sheer size and complexity of many construction projects and
by increasing specialization in the design professions due to technologi-
cal advances.'
The declining importance of design professionals on the construction
site and the imposition of liability upon architects and engineers has
resulted in the addition to their contracts of provisions denying any
right or duty upon which liability might be premised.8 Accordingly,
many courts may be obliged to reformulate the rules of liability of
design professionals with the likely result of a return to the immunity
from suit that architects and engineers once enjoyed under privity rules.
Although this return will almost certainly be contract-based, as was the
original immunity and the departure therefrom, there are important
policy issues that courts and legislatures should consider in deciding
whether design professionals should bear any responsibility for con-
struction accidents. Paramount among these issues are: (1) the inade-
quacy of workmen's compensation laws; (2) the significance of an
architect or engineer's having exercised the power to stop work in a
phase of the construction either related or unrelated to that which was a
cause of the accident; and (3) the assignment of responsibility for safety.
In Krieger v. J.E. Greiner Co.9 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
purportedly resolved the issue of architects' and engineers' liability in
Maryland, deciding against the imposition of liability. Although the
decision was undoubtedly correct, given the facts before the court, it was
5. See Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 912 (1956);
Morris v. Marin County, 18 Cal. 3d 901, 559 P.2d 606, 136 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1977); Dow v.
Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958); Macomber v. Cox, 249 Or. 61, 435 P.2d
462 (1967). See generally AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, HANDBOOK OF ARCHITEC-
TURAL PRACTICE §§ 1.01-9.12 (8th ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOKI; J. SWEET,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 699-700
(2d ed. 1977).
6. See Note, Architectural Malpractice: A Contract-Based Approach, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 1075, 1076-83 (1979).
7. Id. at 1078-80.
8. The duties of inspection and supervision and the right to stop work are those
usually addressed by these provisions. Indeed, the American Institute of Architects has
published standardized contract forms that specifically negate such duties. See AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, ARCHITECT'S HANDBOOK OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (1978); text
accompanying notes 54 to 57 infra.
9. 282 Md. 50. 382 A.2d 1069 (1978).
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based solely on the judges' interpretation of the specific contracts
involved. 10 The court did not discuss, much less resolve, any of the
underlying policy issues, leaving lower courts and litigants, who may be
faced with similar policy considerations but slightly different contracts,
without guidance." Nevertheless, the Krieger decision may play a
significant role in reversing the trend in other jurisdictions to require
design professionals to bear not only the economic burden attributable
to their own fault or neglect, but also the costs attributable to the
negligence of persons over whom they have no control.
This Article will first discuss industry customs, knowledge of which
is necessary to an understanding of the issues involved. It will then
examine the holding in Krieger and consider the policy issues mentioned
above. Lastly, it will suggest legislative and judicial changes appropri-
ate to a resolution of the question of design professionals' liability in
Maryland.
BACKGROUND
Construction Industry Practice
The prospective owner of a building, bridge, or any other improve-
ment to real property calls upon two separate groups of individuals - a
10. Id. at 67-70, 382 A.2d at 1078-80. The court did suggest the possibility that on
remand plaintiffs might be able to state a cause of action against the engineers but
apparently viewed it as also contract-based. Id. at 70, 382 A.2d at 1080. But see id. at
70-73, 382 A.2d at 1080-81 (Levine, J., concurring).
11. See Reynolds, The Court of Appeals of Maryland: Roles, Work and Performance -
Part II: Craftsmanship and Decision-Making, 38 MD. L. REv. 148, 167-69 (1978).
Differences in contract language are more likely to be a function of the
sophistication of the contract drafter than the intention of the design professional in
entering into a particular contract. Rarely does a design professional intend to assume a
responsibility to supervise construction, although his intention does not necessarily
preclude liability to workmen. Accordingly, unless the design professional has consciously
intended to assume such duties, the precise wording used in the contract is not intended to
evidence an intention to provide other than "customary construction phase." When the
architect prepares the contract documents, he will generally use the AIA form or other
standard forms adopting the customary language of the AIA contract. When, however, the
owner's representative prepares the contract documents, there may be less care taken in
the provisions relating to the designer's activities during construction. Thus, on occasion
the word "supervision" creeps into the designer's contract, although the designer neither
intended to assume such additional responsibility nor was he paid to do so.
The only practical significance of the actual language used involves the ability of
innovative attorneys to create causes of action based upon the use of a particular word or
words which might differentiate the contract from those previously reviewed by appellate
courts in the relevant jurisdiction. If the courts in question have applied a consistent policy
approach to the question of liability, the language used in any particular contract should
make little difference.
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design team and a construction team - to provide a complete structure.
The design team includes architects, engineers, or both,1 2 who provide
services customarily divided into four phases: schematic design, design
development, construction documents, and administration of the con-
struction contract. 3 In the schematic design phase the design concept is
established, and determination is made of the overall project cost and
the cost efficiency of the proposed design concept. The design develop-
ment phase includes the preparation of preliminary design drawings,
which establish the size and character of the project and include the
designer's choice of materials and systems. The preliminary design
drawings are then refined and incorporated into bid documents, which
generally include a proposed contract between owner and contractor,
and final design drawings (plans) and specifications, all of which become
known as the contract documents. The owner, sometimes with the
design professional's assistance if the project is particularly complex,
then negotiates with bidders and awards a construction contract.
The construction contract obligates the prime, or general, contrac-
tor to erect the structure in accordance with the contract documents. 4
The contractor is customarily given wide latitude in determining the
methods and means of performing the work required by the contract
documents and in choosing the particular employees or subcontractors to
perform the work. For example, form contracts prepared by the
American Institute of Architects provide: "The Contractor shall super-
vise and direct the Work, using his best skill and attention. He shall be
solely responsible for all construction means, methods, techniques,
sequences and procedures, and for coordinating all portions of the Work
under the Contract.' 15
Generally, the bidder proposing the most efficient and cost effective
means of construction will be selected as the contractor on a particular
construction project. After the contract has been awarded and work
begun by the contractor, the design professional will enter into the
administration of the construction contract phase, during which he will
12. In structures where design features predominate, for example, houses, stores,
and other buildings, an architect is placed in overall charge of the project and may engage
engineers to assist in the preparation of plans and specifications. In industrial projects, for
example, bridges and highways, where engineering features are of paramount import-
ance, the engineer takes the lead. C. DUNHAM & R. YOUNG, CONTRACTS, SPECIFICATIONS AND
LAW FOR ENGINEERS 111 (2d ed. 1971).
13. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, DOCUMENT B551, STATEMENT OF THE
ARCHITECT'S SERVICES (1972 ed.).
14. See, e.g., AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, DOCUMENT A101, STANDARD FORM OF
AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND CONTRACTOR, art. 2 (1970 ed.) [hereinafter cited as
OWNER-CONTRACTOR FORM!.
15. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, DOCUMENT A201, GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE
CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION 4.31 (1970 ed.) [hereinafter cited as GENERAL CONDITIONS].
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be required to be present either continuously or periodically, at the
construction site to determine whether the contractor's work conforms to
the requirements set forth in the contract documents.
This, then, is the basic division of labor between the design and
construction teams - the design team designs the structure and the
construction team constructs it, using its own means, techniques, and
men, to conform to the design. In structuring a body of law governing
the construction industry, courts have carefully drawn a distinction
between the responsibilities of the two groups. The contractor is not
liable for defects in the work attributable to faulty plans or specifica-
tions,"6 and the design team is not responsible for defects in the finished
product attributable to the construction team's failure to perform the
work in a workmanlike manner.'
This distinction becomes blurred when the question before a court is
the liability of an architect or engineer who provides construction
administration services, arbitrating disputes between the owner and the
contractor or judging the quality of workmanship and materials.'8
Whether the design professional assumes a duty to workmen to inspect
for safety hazards or to dictate alternative means of construction when
he believes that those used constitute a hazard are questions made even
more difficult if the design professional has, prior to the incident upon
which suit is based, made such inspections or exercised the power to stop
work.
Traditional Doctrine
In Maryland the question of the design professional's liability to
injured workmen depends on the concept of legal duty. When a person is
negligent in his own affairs but is found to have no legal duty to a
person injured by his negligence, he is not liable in tort." Negligence
alone does not create such a duty.'°
16. Hammaker v. Schleigh, 157 Md. 652, 665, 147 A. 790, 795 (1929). See generally
Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 1394 (1966).
17. See Day v. National U. S. Radiator Corp., 241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660 (1961)
(architect not liable in negligence for personal injuries resulting from subcontractor's
failure to comply with architect's instructions).
18. See, e.g., Lynn v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 60 Md. 404 (1883); GENERAL CONDITIONS,
supra note 15 (1976 ed.).
19. Zamecki v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 202 Md. 54, 60, 95 A.2d 302, 305
(1953) ("Where there is charged non-performance of an act, and yet no duty owed to the
injured party, the law of this State seems to be that the defendant is not liable."); W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 53 (4th ed. 1971).
20. Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 41, 43 (1934). See
generally Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928);
Morison, A Re-Examination of the Duty of Care, 11 MOD. L. REV. 9 (1948); Prosser,
Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1953).
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By the same token, the creation of a contractual obligation will not
give rise to a legal duty to one not a party to the contract unless the
parties to the contract intend to create such a duty." Only when the
breach of contract also violates an independent duty imposed by law
does a cause of action accrue to an injured third person.2 Deciding
whether there is an independent duty imposed by law may depend upon
the ultimate policy sought to be furthered.
As Dean Prosser has observed, "'duty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but
only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to
protection."23 Thus the answer to the question whether the design
professional owes a duty to workmen may be reached in two separate
ways: either by determining that the design professional and the owner
intended by their contract that the design professional assume such an
obligation, or by deciding that public policy requires the creation of a
legal duty irrespective of the language of the owner-architect or
owner-engineer contract.
Architects and engineers have traditionally been held to have no
duty to supervise methods of construction or to inspect for safety
hazards. This rule was based upon the doctrine of privity and on the
traditional role played by design professionals.24 The presence of
architects or engineers at a job site was regarded as being solely for the
benefit of the owner, to insure that the structure was being built in
accordance with the contract documents.' Their supervisory power was
usually governed by provision in the owner-contractor contract.2" Failure
to perform the duty of supervision could result in tort or contract
liability, but an action generally could be brought only by the owner,
with whom there was privity of contract.2 1
In 1952 the American Institute of Architects sought to give
contractual recognition to the established legal rule denying liability of
design professionals to parties outside the contracting group. The
21. Marlboro Shirt Co. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 196 Md. 565, 570, 77 A.2d 776, 777
(1951); McClare v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 266 N.Y. 371, 195 N.E. 15 (1933);
Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
22. Heckrotte v. Riddle, 224 Md. 591, 595, 168 A.2d 879, 882 (1961).
23. W. PROSSER, supra note 19, § 53, at 325-26.
24. See, e.g., Garden City Floral Co. v. Hunt, 126 Mont. 537, 255 P.2d 352 (1953);
GENERAL CONDITIONS, supra note 15, art. 38 (1963 ed.).
25. See Hubert v. Aiken, 15 Daly 237, 5 N.Y.S. 839 (Sup. Ct. 1889); C. DUNtlAM & R.
YOUNG, supra note 12, at 4; J. SWEET, supra note 5, at 92-94.
26. See Sweet, Owner-Architect-Contractor: Another Eternal Triangle, 47 CA.IF. L.
REV. 645, 646 (1959).
27. See J. SWEET, supra note 5, at 838-39; Note, supra note 6, at 1077-78.
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Institute published form construction industry contracts,' including
owner-architect agreements,29 owner-contractor agreements," and form
General Conditions of the construction contract."
The General Conditions provided in its article 38:
The Architect shall have general supervision and direction of
the work. He is the agent of the Owner only to the extent provided
in the Contract Documents and when in special instances he is
authorized by the Owner so to act, and in such instances he shall,
upon request, show the Contractor written authority. He has
authority to stop the work whenever such stoppage may be
necessary to insure the proper execution of the Contract.32
Although the language of article 38 was intended to limit the liability
of architects, it was that language that eventually was used to establish
a contractually based duty to inspect for safety hazards.
Liability for Design Professionals
Following the New York Court of Appeals' rejection of the doctrine
of privity as a ground for denying recovery, 3 the Arkansas Supreme
Court found in Erhart v. Hummonds' a contract-based duty of an
architect to protect workmen at a construction site. Instead of directly
attacking the established rule that discouraged the imposition of
28. In 1888 the American Institute of Architects, in conjunction with the National
Association of Builders, published the Uniform Contract, which became the accepted
standard building construction contract for over 25 years. During the next 90 years, the
Institute, with organizations of builders, engineers, and subcontractors, published many
other construction form documents. See generally W. PARKER & F. ADAMS, THE ALA
STANDARD CONTRACT FoaMs AND THE LAW (1954).
29. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, DOCUMENT B141, STANDARD FORM OF AGREE-
MENT BETWEEN OWNER AND ARCHITECT (1952 ed.) [hereinafter cited as OWNER-ARCHITECT
FORM]. Publication of this form began in 1917.
30. OWNER-CONTRACTOR FORM, supra note 14.
31. GENERAL CONDITIONS, supra note 15 (1952 ed.).
32. Id. art. 38.
33. Inman v. Binghamton Hous. Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d
699 (1957). The court concluded that architects could be held liable in negligence for
injuries to third parties not in privity with them. In extending the doctrine of MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), the court reasoned that "'there is
no visible reason for any distinction between the liability of one who supplies a chattel and
one who erects a structure."' 3 N.Y.2d at 140, 143 N.E.2d at 898, 164 N.Y.S.2d at 702
(quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 517 (2d ed. 1955)). The court,
however, affirmed the dismissal of all the plaintiffs claims, because the plaintiff failed to
allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under the McPherson rule.
34. 232 Ark. 133, 334 S.W.2d 869 (1960).
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liability as a matter of policy, plaintiffs theorized that language closely
resembling that of article 38 in their contract was intended to create a
duty to inspect for and warn of safety hazards. Suit was brought after a
poorly shored excavation wall collapsed, killing three workmen. The
architects had detected the hazard before the accident and had
threatened to stop work unless the problem was corrected but took no
such action.3 5 Plaintiffs alleged that the architects had a duty under the
contract to exercise their power to stop work in order to protect
workmen from possible injury. 6 The court held that the architects' duty
of supervision included enforcing the contractor's obligation to provide a
safe working environment."
Six years later, in Walker v. Wittenberg, Delony & Davidson, Inc.,38
the Arkansas Supreme Court reaffirmed Erhart,5 and imposed liability
on a design professional for an accident caused by the negligence of a
construction team. For reasons not evident from the record, the court
reconsidered its decision in Walker three months later, and, in a
complete turnabout, held that the language of article 38 could not be
interpreted to create a duty on the part of an architect to inspect for
safety, thereby rejecting its own earlier decision in Erhart.4 0 The
Arkansas court in the second Walker opinion adopted the rationale of a
Louisiana decision, Day v. National U.S. Radiator Corp.4 1
35. Id. at 135, 334 S.W.2d at 871.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 138, 334 S.W.2d at 872. The court noted that the architect had been paid an
additional sum by the owner to supervise the construction. Moreover, the agreement
between the owner and the contractor provided for the maintenance of certain safety
conditions at the job site. The court concluded that the injuries to the construction workers
which resulted from a violation of the safety provisions were the responsibility of the
supervising architect. Id. The dissent pointed out, however, that it was the contractor who
was responsible for safety under the contract documents. Id. at 142, 334 S.W.2d at 874-75
(Ward, J., dissenting).
38. 241 Ark. 525, 412 S.W.2d 621 (1966), rev'd on rehearing, 242 Ark. 976, 412 S.W.2d
626 (1967). In Walker a workman on a construction site was seriously injured when an
exterior wall on which he was standing collapsed after the wall's supports had been
prematurely removed.
39. The court observed: "The contention that the sole duty of the architects was to
supervise to the end that the building would conform to plans and specifications when
completed, was likewise the principal defense in Erhart v. Hummonds ... , but we upheld
a judgment against the appellant architects in that case." Id. at 527, 412 S.W.2d at 624
(citation omitted).
40. 242 Ark. 976, 979, 412 S.W.2d 626, 630 (1967). Although the court did not
specifically overrule its prior opinion, it limited Erhart narrowly to its own facts.
41. 241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660 (1961).
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In Day a wrongful death action was brought after a boiler exploded
while being improperly installed by a subcontractor on a construction
site. Plaintiffs contended that the architects had assumed a contractual
obligation to make "frequent visits to the work site" to insure strict
conformity of the work with contract requirements.2 Determining that
such a contractual provision did not require the architects to control the
methods by which contractors performed their work, the Louisiana
Supreme Court stated:
As we view the matter, the primary object of this provision was
to impose the duty or obligation on the architects to insure to the
owner that before final acceptance of the work the building would
be completed in accordance with the plans and specifications; and to
insure this result the architects were to make "frequent visits to the
work site" during the progress of the work. Under the contract they
as architects had no duty to supervise the contractor's method of
doing the work. In fact, as architects they had no power or control
over the contractor's method of performing his contract, unless such
power was provided for in the specifications. Their duty to the
owner was to see that before final acceptance of the work the plans
and specifications had been complied with, that proper materials
had been used, and generally that the owner secured the building it
had contracted for.4
In January 1967, one month after the Arkansas Supreme Court
reaffirmed Erhart in Walker and two months before it reconsidered and
tacitly overruled Erhart, the Supreme Court of Illinois decided Miller v.
DeWitt," which was to become a leading case supporting the extension
of the design professional's liability.45 In Miller, several workmen, who
were injured in the collapse of a gymnasium roof on which they were
working, brought suit against the project architects. Liability was
asserted on two grounds - common law negligence and violation of the
42. The Day court was faced with the question whether the architect had a duty to
inspect a boiler before and during installation. The duty was alleged to arise from the
contract with the owner, which bound the architect to exercise "'adequate supervision of
the execution of the work to reasonably insure strict conformity with the working
drawings, specifications, and other contract documents.'" Id. at 295, 128 So. 2d at 666
(quoting the owner-architect contract).
43. Id.
44. 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
45. See, e.g., McInerney v. Hasbrook Constr. Co., 62 Ill. 2d 93, 338 N.E.2d 868 (1975);
Voss v. Kingdon & Naven, Inc., 60 Ill. 2d 520, 328 N.E.2d 297 (1975).
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Illinois Structural Work Act.' The Illinois Supreme Court found for the
plaintiffs on both grounds, 4  and its holding on the negligence theory
had a wide impact. Citing only Erhart, the court held: "From a careful
examination of the record we conclude that if the architects knew or in
the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the shoring was
inadequate and unsafe, they had the right and corresponding duty to
stop the work until the unsafe condition had been remedied. '4
Miller, unlike prior relevant cases, received widespread publicity
and comment.49 The controversy apparently centered on the meaning
and effect of contractual provisions for "supervision." Courts following
the Miller rationale took the position that "supervision" provisions
created an implicit duty to supervise methods employed at the
construction site.' Courts following the Day rationale held that use of
the term "supervision" in a provision similar to article 38 was not to be
construed to require design professionals to control the "method and
manner of doing the details of the work."'" One court observed that the
term "supervision" had been included in the architect's contract only to
demonstrate the parties' intention that he would provide such "supervis-
46. Ch. 48, § 1, 1907 Ill. Laws 312 (present version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 60
(1969)). The Illinois Structural Work Act pertains to safety of construction scaffolds,
hoists, cranes, and other structural components and imposes civil liability on certain
categories of persons who willfully violate its provisions, e.g., persons "in charge of" the
work. ILL. REV. STAT. CH. 48, § 48, 69.
47. The court observed that the architects "had charge" of the work because of their
contractural right to stop work. 37 Ill. 2d at 280, 226 N.E.2d at 639. More recent Illinois
decisions have confined the Miller holding to the structural work and thus abrogated its
holding as to common law liability. See McGovern v. Standish, 65 11. 2d 54, 357 N.E.2d
1134 (1976); Getz v. Del E. Webb Corp., 38 Ill. App. 3d 880, 349 N.E.2d 682 (1976).
48. 37 Ill. 2d at 279, 226 N.E.2d at 638 (citing Erhart v. Hummonds, 232 Ark. 133,
334 S.W.2d 869 (1960)).
49. See, e.g., Note, Torts - Architect's Liability in His Capacity as a Supervisor, 17
DEPAUL L. REV. 439 (1968); Note, The Architect's Tort Liability for Personal Injury. 17
DRAKE L. REV. 242 (1968); Note, Liability of Design Professionals - The Necessity of Fault,
58 IOWA L. REV. 1221, 1224 n.24 (1973); Comment, The Supervising Architect: His
Liabilities and His Remedies when a Worker is Injured, 64 Nw. L. REV. 535, 546-48 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Supervising Architect].
50. See, e.g., Associated Eng'rs, Inc. v. Job, 370 F.2d 633 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 823 (1967); McGovern v. Standish, 33 111. App. 3d 717, 341 N.E.2d 739 (1975), affd, 65
Ill. 2d 54, 357 N.E.2d 1134 (1976); Amant v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 10 Wash. App.
785, 520 P.2d 181 (1974), affd, 84 Wash. 2d 872, 529 P.2d 829 (1975) (per curiam).
51. Reber v. Chandler High School Dist. No. 202, 13 Ariz. App. 133, 136, 474 P.2d
852, 855 (1970). Accord, Seeney v. Dover Country Club Apts., 318 A.2d 619 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1974); Jackson v. Sergent, Hauskins & Beckwith Eng'rs, Inc., 20 Ariz. App. 330, 512
P.2d 862 (1973).
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ory controls" as would be reasonably necessary to assure that the final
structure would be constructed in accordance with applicable contract
documents.5
2
Reaction of the Design Profession
The conflict between the Miller and Day approaches provoked a
two-pronged assault by the profession on design professional liability.
The American Institute of Architects first attacked the problem at its
source, by revising its form contract documents. The organization then
lobbied Congress to broaden the exclusive remedy provisions of the
proposed National Workers' Compensation Act of 1975,0 in an effort to
preclude, by law, actions by construction workers against all supervisory
personnel.
The revision of the form contract documents, begun in 1967, focused
on eliminating the troublesome words "supervision" and "inspection." A
disclaimer of liability for construction methods and safety was added,
and article 38 was deleted. The new provision, article 1.1.14, read:
The Architect shall make periodic visits to the site to familiarize
himself generally with the progress and quality of the Work and to
determine in general if the Work is proceeding in accordance with
the Contract Documents. On the basis of his on-site observations as
an architect, he shall endeavor to guard the Owner against defects
and deficiencies in the Work of the Contractor. The Architect shall
not be required to make exhaustive or continuous on-site inspec-
tions to check the quality or quantity of the Work. The Architect
shall not be responsible for construction means, methods, techniques,
sequences or procedures, or for safety precautions and programs in
connection with the Work, and he shall not be responsible for the
Contractor's failure to carry out the Work in accordance with the
Contract Documents5
52. Reber v. Chandler High School Dist. No. 202, 13 Ariz. App. 133, 136, 474 P.2d
852, 855, (1970). The court held:
In our opinion, provisions such as these are insufficient to support, and in fact negate,
a finding that the parties intended that the architect have the obligation or duty to
control the contractor and his employees in the method and manner of doing the
details of the work. Such provisions are more consonant with an intention that the
architect have such supervisory controls as are necessary to assure that the results of
the contractor's work comply in technical detail with the plans and specifications
prepared by the architect.
53. S. 2018, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 61067 (1975).
54. OWNER-ARCHITECT FORM, supra note 29, art. 1.1.14 (1974 ed.) (emphasis added).
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No longer would design professionals supervise construction or inspect
the work. Instead, they would administer the construction contract by
visiting the site and becoming generally familiar with work progress
and quality; not only was the power to stop work eliminated, but the
duty to protect zealously the owner's interests was reduced to making an
"endeavor to guard the Owner against defects and deficiencies",5 in the
contractor's work.
Even this language did not seem to solve the problem completely,
and article 1.1.14 was subsequently replaced by articles 1.5.4 and 1.5.5.11
These articles further defined the architect's duties and limited his
responsibilities:
1.5.4 The Architect shall visit the site at intervals appropriate to
the stage of construction or as otherwise agreed by the Architect in
writing to become generally familiar with the process and quality of
the Work and to determine in general if the Work is proceeding in
accordance with the Contract Documents. However, the Architect
shall not be required to make exhaustive or continous on-site
inspections to check the quality or quantity of the Work. On the
basis of such on-site observations as an architect, the Architect
shall keep the Owner informed of the progress and quality of the
Work, and shall endeavor to guard the Owner against defects and
deficiencies in the Work of the Contractor.
1.5.5 The Architect shall not have control or charge of and shall not
be responsible for construction means, methods, techniques, sequ-
ences or procedures, or for safety precautions and programs in
connection with the Work, for the acts or omissions of the Contractor,
Subcontractors or any other persons performing any of the Work in
accordance with the Contract Documents.57
In some states the change in language appeared to achieve the
desired effect. Appellate courts in Missouri' and Indiana" rejected
attempts to impose liability on architects and engineers based upon the
language of the revised A.I.A. documents. The Indiana court analyzed
each provision of the owner-architect agreement and also the owner-
contractor agreement in reaching its conclusion that the architect had
55. Id.
56. Id. arts. 1.5.4, 1.5.5 (1977 ed.).
57. Id. (emphasis added). While the 1974 and 1977 editions of the form contract
documents differ in organization, the rearticulation of the architect's duties is the only
major substantive change.
58. Brown v. Gamble Constr. Co., 537 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. App. 1976).
59. Walters v. Kellam & Foley, 360 N.E.2d 199 (Ind. App. 1977).
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not assumed a duty to workmen. The applicable clauses provided that
(1) the architect would have approvals "only for conformance with the
design concept"; (2) the architect would "make periodic visits to the site
. . .to determine in general if the work [was] proceeding in accordance
with the contract documents"; (3) the architect would not "guarantee the
Contractor's performance" or take responsibility for the "construction
means, methods, techniques, sequences or procedures or for safety
precautions"; (4) the architect took no responsibility for "acts or
omissions of the Contractor, any subcontractor or any of their agents or
employees"; (5) the contractor would be responsible for the acts,
omissions and safety of his employees and all other persons performing
any of the work under a contract with the contractor; and (6) the
contractor would indemnify the owner as a result of claims arising from
the contractor's failure to comply with the requirements of the
construction contract.' The court concluded that the provisions did not
establish a duty of supervision or control over construction methods and
procedures and declined to impose liability, adopting the reasoning of
the Louisiana Supreme Court in Day v. National U.S. Radiator Corp.6 1
In 1975 the A.I.A. implemented the second prong of its attack on
design professional liability by lobbying Congress for protective legisla-
tion." Relying on legal commentaries acknowledging the basic inequity
of permitting the active tortfeasors (contractors or subcontractors) to
escape liability while not granting a similar statutory immunity to
design professionals,6 the A.I.A. sought to include architects and
engineers among those against whom suit was proscribed by law. The
language of the applicable section of the proposed National Workers'
Compensation Act of 1975 was as follows:
The benefits to which employees are entitled under section 5 of
this Act, and such additional benefits as a State may provide, shall
constitute the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer,
any other person engaged, directly or indirectly, with respect to the
same location, (1) in the accomplishment of a connected or related
objective or, (2) acting in furtherance of a common undertaking with
the employee's employer, and any collective bargaining agent of the
employees of such employer for any occupational illness, injury, or
death arising out of and in the course of employment."
60. Id. at 208 n.5.
61. Id. at 210; 241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660 (1961).
62. American Institute of Architects, Statement Submitted to the Subcommittee on
Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate (May 11, 1976).
63. See, e.g., Supervising Architect, supra note 49.
64. S. 2018, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 61067 (1975) (emphasis added).
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Although the proposed act did not become law'65 the design professions
will undoubtedly continue attempts to remedy, through both national
and state legislation, what they perceive to be a basic inequity.
It was in this historical context that the Maryland Court of Appeals
decided Krieger v. JE. Greiner Co.' Although the court's adoption of the
Day rationale may be regarded as establishing a rule of law in
Maryland against design professional liability for construction site
accidents, the decision may be narrowly limited to its interpretation of
the specific contractual provisions involved. The court left for another
day any decision on the issue of assumption of duty independent of
contract.67
THE KRIEGER OPINION
The Court's Decision
Krieger had its inception when Leroy E. Krieger, a construction
worker employed by Bildot Steel Corporation (Bildot), a subcontractor
on the Outer Harbor Bridge construction project, was injured by a
falling steel bar, one of thirty-two that had been stood on end to be used
as reinforcement for concrete columns. Six of the thirty-two had been
welded into place, but the others, including the one that injured Krieger
and killed a co-worker, were supported only by No. 9 guy wire.' The use
of the particular guy wire and the choice of method by which the steel
bars were to be raised constituted part of the "methods and means"
employed by the contractor (in this case by a subcontractor). The
contract documents required only that the contractor use steel reinforc-
ing bars in the concrete columns. 9 The method of installation of the bars
was not specified, and the choice of method could have had no adverse
effect on whether the finished bridge complied with the construction
contract.
65. The bill died in committee.
66. 282 Md. 50, 382 A.2d 1069 (1978).
67. See id. at 70, 382 A.2d at 1080. Judge Levine addressed the question in his
concurring opinion. He maintained that, independent of any contractual obligations an
architect may have, an architect's actions on the site may give rise to a duty to exercise
reasonable care. Judge Levine reasoned that when an architect unilaterally halts work on
the construction site in order to protect workmen, he assumes a duty of care and must
thereafter act reasonably or be subject to liability for damages if injury results. Id. at
70-73, 382 A.2d at 1080-81 (Levine, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 56, 382 A.2d at 1072-73.
69. Id. at 54, 382 A.2d at 1071.
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Krieger was obviously entitled to workmen's compensation benefits
from his employer Bildot. The Maryland Workmen's Compensation Act,
however, provides that the liability of an employer who procures the
required compensation is limited to the payment of benefits under the
Act.7" This "exclusive benefit" rule bars a tort action against an
employer even though the accident occurred as a result of his
negligence." The theory underlying such provisions is that they are part
of the "quid pro quo in which the sacrifices and gains of employees and
employers are to some extent put in balance, for, while the employer
assumes a new liability without fault, he is relieved of the prospect of
large damage verdicts."72 In Krieger the contract documents placed
certain affirmative duties regarding safety of workmen7" on the general
contractor, a joint venture comprised of three contracting firms, which,
in the absence of workmen's compensation law, would have been liable
to Krieger in tort. The general contractor group was immune to suit by
Krieger because the workmen's compensation law protects a person
retaining others to perform work "which is a part of his trade, business
or occupation which he has contracted to perform. 7 4 Such a provision is
not uncommon," and the Maryland provision is premised upon the
theory that because a general contractor is legally obligated to provide
workmen's compensation benefits to employees of subcontractors it
should be entitled to immunity from suit whether it or the subcontractor
actually purchases the compensation insurance policy. 16
70. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 15 (1979). Section 15 provides that "[the liability
prescribed [herein] shall be exclusive ....
71. Wood v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 260 Md. 651, 273 A.2d 125 (1971); Flood v.
Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 230 Md. 373, 187 A.2d 320 (1963); Cox v. Sandier's, Inc., 209 Md.
193, 120 A.2d 674 (1956); Hart v. Sealtest, Inc., 186 Md. 183, 46 A.2d 293 (1946);
Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 674, 39 A.2d 858 (1944).
72. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 65.10, at 12-3, 12-4. "'[Tihe statute has given to
labor what it never had before, and has taken away from capital what it has always
enjoyed, and has compensated the latter by limiting its liability .... .' Wood v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 260 Md. 651, 660, 273 A.2d 125, 131 (1971) (quoting Victory Sparkler Co.
v. Francks, 147 Md. 368, 376, 128 A. 635, 638 (1925)).
73. These were to "' [o]bserve and comply with all Federal, State, and local laws or
ordinances that affect those employed or engaged by him on the project. . . or the conduct
of the work .... ' " and to "'" be responsible for all damage to life and property due to its
activities or those of its agents or employees in connection with the services required
under the Contract."' " 282 Md. at 53, 382 A.2d at 1071 (quoting provisions of general
contractor's agreement with state, quoted in plaintiffs' declaration).
74. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 62 (1979).
75. Forty-three states have included similar provisions in their workmen's compensa-
tion statutes. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.31, at 14-47 n.46.
76. See State v. Benjamin F. Bennett Bldg. Co., 154 Md. 159, 164, 140 A.52, 54 (1928).
There appears to be a split of authority in other jurisdictions as to whether the principal
contractor is entitled to immunity if the claimant's direct employer procured the required
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The two financially responsible entities directly at fault in Krieger,
the contractor and subcontractor, were immune from liability under
workmen's compensation laws." The owner of the project, the State of
Maryland, was not immune under the workmen's compensation laws, 8
but was entitled to sovereign immunity."9 Krieger and his wife therefore
filed suit only against the project engineers, J.E. Greiner Co., Inc.
(Greiner) and Zollman Associates, Inc. (Zollman). Greiner had been
employed by the State to perform the first three categories of
engineering services' and to perform certain designated construction
phase services, including coordination of Zollman's activities. Zollman's
services were limited to providing on-site inspection services during the
construction phase.
Krieger alleged that the engineers, who owed a duty of care to him
by reason of their contracts with the State,8 knew, or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known, of the dangerous methods used by
Bildot to erect the reinforcing bars; that they failed to stop work or to
require corrective action as permitted under their contract with the
State; and that they were thereby liable to the plaintiffs." Krieger
further alleged that the engineers had assumed a duty to stop work
whenever they observed improper construction practices because they
insurance. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 72.31, at 14-49. The majority of new cases
and Larson's view of the "sounder result" support the theory that the general contractor is
entitled to immunity if the direct employer procured the necessary insurance. Id.
As applied to the construction field, these "exclusive remedy" provisions produce a
somewhat anomalous result. Should a project engineer or architect enter into a contract
with the owner not only to design the structure but also to build it using subcontractors,
he would be immune from liability because he would be obligated to procure workmen's
compensation insurance - the cost of which would be borne by the owner. This immunity
would attach despite his responsibility for methods, means and techniques of construction,
including the safety of workers. Yet if the design professional assumes no "build"
obligation, as is usually the case, there attaches no immunity from liability even though
he has no responsibility for methods and means of construction.
77. Indeed, the primary tortfeasors could not even be held liable for indemnity or
contribution. See Congressional Country Club, Inc. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 194 Md. 533, 71
A.2d 696 (1950); note 93 infra.
78. See Honaker v. W.C. & A.N. Miller Dev. Co., 278 Md. 453, 365 A.2d 287 (1976).
79. Spriggs v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 267 Md. 679, 298 A.2d 442 (1973). The state would
probably not have been liable in any event, as the Maryland Court of Special Appeals has
held that a construction contractor is an independent contractor and not an agent of the
owner. Cutlip v. Lucky Stores, 22 Md. App. 673, 325 A.2d 432 (1974). Thus, unless the
premises were in an unreasonably dangerous condition or there was a peculiar risk
inherent in the work, the owner would not be liable for the torts of the contractor or
subcontractor. See id. at 684-86, 325 A.2d at 438-40.
80. See text accompanying notes 12 to 14 supra.
81. 282 Md. at 55, 382 A.2d at 1072.
82. Id. at 56, 382 A.2d at 1072-73.
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had done so on prior occasions when improper methods were being
employed.3 The engineers demurred on the ground that they owed no
duty to the plaintiffs. They asserted that their contract with the State
established as a matter of law that they were employed only to
determine whether the completed structure conformed to the contract
documents and that they had no contractual obligation to inspect for
safety. The demurrer was sustained by the Superior Court of Baltimore
City, the plaintiffs appealed, and certiorari was granted by the Court of
Appeals prior to review by the Court of Special Appeals.4
Although the court was faced with Maryland precedents espousing
contrary views,' it held that the defendant engineers in Krieger had
been under no contractual duty either to act as safety inspectors on the
project or to direct the methods employed by the contractor.' The court
based its decision primarily on its interpretation of the precise
contractual language involved:
We find no provisions in these contracts imposing any duty on
the engineers to supervise the methods of construction ...
We likewise find nothing in the contracts imposing any duty on
the engineers to supervise safety in connection with construction.
The duty of the engineers under their contracts is to assure a
certain end result, a completed bridge which complies with the
plans and specifications previously prepared by Greiner. It will be
observed that many of the cases which have held architects and
engineers responsible for safety have done so upon the basis of the
construction by the courts of the contracts existing between the
engineer or architect and the owner. We hold that a fair interpreta-
tion of the contracts between the Commission and Greiner and
Zollman is that the duties of those engineers do not include
supervision of construction methods or supervision of work for
compliance with safety laws and regulations."
83. Id.
84. See MD. CTS. & JuD. PRoc. CODE ANN. §§ 12-201, -202 (1974).
85. State v. City of Baltimore, 199 Md. 287, 86 A.2d 618 (1952); Otis Elevator Co. v.
Embert, 198 Md. 585, 84 A.2d 876 (1951); Cutlip v. Lucky Stores, 22 Md. App. 673, 325
A.2d 432 (1974).
86. 282 Md. at 69-70, 382 A.2d at 1079-80.
By implication, the Court of Appeals may also have settled the question whether
a design professional owes a common law duty to workmen on the construction site. Had a
common law duty on the part of the designer to workmen existed, there would have been
no need for the court to examine the designer's contract with the owner to see whether any
duty was created in that instrument or to explore the question of whether the designer
voluntarily assumed such a duty. Thus, the court's analysis leads this author to conclude
that in Maryland no common law duty exists.
87. Id. at 69, 382 A.2d at 1079.
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Unanswered Policy Questions
The Court of Appeals has apparently settled the question whether a
design professional supervising or inspecting work at a construction site
owes, under his contract with the owner, any duty to injured workmen.'
Because the decision will limit design professionals' liability for
construction site accidents, 9 it would have been helpful to bench and bar
-. [ll~ -ll l~ ig -e ,C w I I-. _ 1 14 1 .11 P-! Cy go l.;
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was attempting to implement by its decision. All the necessary
contractual language was available in Krieger for the court to adopt the
Miller v. DeWitt rationale: the word "supervision" was scattered
throughout the engineers' contracts, and the plaintiffs alleged that
Greiner and Zollman had actual knowledge of the ultra-hazardous
construction practices employed by Bildot and that the engineers had
the right to stop work under their respective contracts.9 Nevertheless,
the court chose not to impose liability, and gave no indication of having
considered the policy arguments in favor of imposing liability.
The court could have considered whether the imposition of liability
on an engineer in such cases might reduce the incidence of construction
site accidents, and determined that design professionals should, because
of their training and expertise, have a general obligation to insure
safety as a matter of policy. It could have adopted a risk distribution
approach, and concluded that design professionals are able to obtain
insurance and pass on the cost in the form of higher prices, and are thus
in a better position to spread the loss than are injured workers.9 ' Had
the court considered these reasons for imposing liability it is likely it
would have decided that neither was practicable, given the customs of
the industry. Generally the contractor is selected on the basis of his bid,
which, in turn, is based upon his choice of the most cost effective method
88. Id.
89. Id. at 56-57, 382 A.2d at 1073.
90. Id. at 55-56, 382 A.2d at 1072.
91. For further discussion of this theory, see Supervising Architect, supra note 49:
It has been suggested that injuries which occur in an industrial-commercial
setting should be regarded as costs of production and borne by those who benefit from
the enterprise. It is argued that the purpose of tort law should be to compensate
injuries with as little social loss as possible, and that enterprises, by obtaining
insurance and passing on the cost in the form of higher prices, are in a better position
to spread the loss than the injured workers. At first this would seem to militate
against imposing liability on a third party outside the employer-employee relation-
ship. But when the third party is also in a position to spread the risk of loss and is one
of the principal beneficiaries of the enterprise (as the architect is), then there is no
reason why he should escape liability.
Id. at 545 (footnote omitted).
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of construction. If the project architect or engineer were given supervis-
ory authority (including the right to stop work) regarding construction
methods, the established bidding system used in the awarding of
construction contracts would become exceedingly more complicated, and
construction costs would undoubtedly increase. Judge House, dissenting
in Miller v. DeWitt, aptly summarized the problem:
There would be utter chaos if the contractor or his superintendent
were to give an order to use his most efficient equipment and
personnel, and the architect attempted to countermand and order
that the work be done by another method requiring different
equipment and skills. When a contractor bids a job he expects to use
his equipment and the special talents and experience of his
organization. If the threat existed that the details of carrying out
his contract be subject to outside interference, contractors naturally
would take that into consideration in fixing their bids. If the duty of
architects is expanded to require that they be on the job at all times
and prescribe methods of construction or be held liable for the
negligence of employees of the contractor, they will reflect that
added burden in their supervision fees. All of this adds up to an
additional and, I think, unnecessary and unwarranted financial
burden upon the public without a commensurate benefit. Liability
of architects as imposed here is economically unsound.9"
In addition to industry customs, existing statutes and the considera-
tions for their enactment militate against a risk distribution approach
placing sole liability on design professionals.9 3 An approach that fails to
take into account the employer ignores the accident cost distribution
dictated by the Maryland workmen's compensation statute. Although it
92. 37 Ill. 2d 273, 281, 226 N.E.2d 630, 643 (1967). Judge House's comment regarding
the lack of benefit to be gained from imposing liability on design professionals should not
be interpreted as a disregard for safety considerations in favor of "practicality," but as a
denial of any increase in job safety under such a scheme.
93. It should be noted that in evaluating the ability of the design professional to bear
and distribute the costs of a workman's injuries for a construction site accident, the costs to
be considered from the worker's point of view are those that exceed the amount of
workmen's compensation available to him, those that the design professional must bear
are the total costs of the accident. A worker will be able to obtain some compensation from
his employer. If he is able to recover from the design professional, the amount of benefits
received are to be repaid to his employer's compensation insurance carrier. MD. ANN. CODE
art. 101, § 58 (1979). Recovery from the design professional thus does not merely
supplement what the worker receives as compensation, with a portion of the total cost paid
by the professional and a portion by the employer, which seems reasonable, it relieves the
employer of the payment of any cost at all. Although the result seems fair in a case in
which the employer is not at fault, for example, an automobile accident that occurs when
an employee is making deliveries, it seems rather harsh to impose the costs of construction
site accidents due to the use of improper methods or practices by the employer on the
design professional alone.
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may be argued that the primary purpose of workmen's compensation
legislation was to shift the burden of paying for industrial accidents
from the employee to the employer, such legislation may indicate a
conviction on the part of legislators that employers not only can pay for
such accidents better than their employees, but that if they must pay for
them, they can and will do much to prevent them. In addition to this
indirect sanction of additional costs, recent federal and state legislation
provides direct sanctions to promote job safety for workers.
The enactment by Congress of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970" was to "assure so far as possible every working man and
woman in the nation safe and healthful working conditions, '95 and the
Act decreed that the employer "furnish to each of his employees
employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized
hazards." 96 The Act further provided for the promulgation of regulations
designed to implement and enforce its stated intention.' In 1973 the
Maryland legislature enacted the Maryland Occupational Safety and
Health Act. 8 The Act created an Occupational Safety and Health
Advisory Board,' which proposes regulations and standards to the
Commissioner of Labor, who decides whether to promulgate them.'" It
gave the Commissioner both inside investigative powers and the means
by which to enforce regulations and standards."°1
94. Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 3, 84 Stat. 1591 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(1976)). The Act applies to all construction industry activity which affects interstate
commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).
96. Id. § 654(a)(1).
97. Id. § 657(g)(2).
98. Ch. 59, 1973 Md. Laws 89 (now codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, §§ 28-49 (1979
& Cum. Supp. 1979)).
99. MD. ANN. CODE art. 89, § 31 (1979). The Occupational Safety and Health Advisory
Board is composed of 11 members appointed by the Commissioner of Labor and Industry.
The Board consults with the Commissioner, making recommendations and proposing rules
and regulations. Id. § 31(b). The Board's regulatory purview includes standards for toxic
materials and dangerous physical agents, warning labels for employees, etc. Id.
§ 31(d)-(e). They may appoint special committees to deal with specific problems. Id. § 31(f).
100. Id. § 31(i).
101. Id. §§ 35-37, 40, 41 (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1979). The Commissioner is vested with
the authority to make inspections of employers' premises. Id. § 35 (1979). He is to issue
citations to violating employers and order correction within a specified period. Id. § 36
(Cum. Supp. 1979).
A civil penalty no greater than $1,000 must be issued for each serious violation,
unless the employer could not with reasonable diligence have known of the violation, id.
§ 40(b), and may be issued for non-serious violations, id. § 40(c). A penalty of $1,000 per
day may be assessed for failure to correct a cited violation, id. § 40(d), and a penalty of
$10,000 may be issued for willful or repeated violations, id. § 40(a).
Criminal penalties of $10,000 or six months' imprisonment or both or, for a second
offense, $20,000 or one year's imprisonment or both may follow a willful violation
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Society is thus already incurring the financial burden of two layers
of governmental job safety administration, neither of which places the
responsibility for job safety on persons other than employers. As regards
the construction industry, both owners (in the contract documents) and
workmen's compensation carriers (who are anxious to reduce the
number of claims filed against them) also place the responsibility for a
safe working environment upon the construction team - contractors
and subcontractors.
As an alternative argument to that based upon the contracts, the
plaintiffs in Krieger alleged that the defendant engineers had, on
several occasions prior to the accident, assumed a duty to supervise the
work, and that such voluntary acts created a duty to workmen to
continue to do so. °2 It was not alleged that the prior incidents were
causally related to the incident in which Krieger was injured, nor that
Bildot, Krieger's employer, relied on the prior activities of the engineers
in performing the work that led to the accident in question. Lacking
those allegations, plaintiffs' argument can only be that any voluntary
assumption of duty during the course of a construction project estab-
lishes such a duty for the remainder of the project. Such a rule of law,
given the lack of reliance or causality and given the length of many
modern construction projects, 3 would violate the principle of tort law
upon which it is based.0 4 Nor would such a rule promote job safety, as it
would discourage architects and engineers from ever suggesting or
requiring safety improvements in order to avoid an unwanted, and often
resulting in an employee's death. Id. § 41(a). A fine of $5,000 or six months' imprisonment
or both may be imposed for an employer's making knowingly false statements in reports
and records required under the Act. Id. § 41(c).
102. 282 Md. at 55, 382 A,2d at 1072. It was further specifically alleged that the
engineers had exercised their [contractual] right to stop the work on numerous other
occasions when said work either did not conform to the plans and specifications or was
being performed in a negligent and dangerous manner which was unsafe for the workmen
employed on the project.'" Id. (quoting plaintiffs declaration). There was disagreement
among the judges regarding the sufficiency of the complaint as to such allegations,
compare id. at 70, 382 A.2d at 1080, with id. at 70-73, 382 A.2d at 1080-81 (Levine, J.,
concurring), but the majority granted plaintiffs leave to amend their declaration on
remand, id. at 70, 382 A.2d at 1080.
103. For example, the Outer Harbor Bridge project on which Krieger was employed
took several years to complete.
104. See Hoover v. Williamson, 236 Md. 250, 253-54, 203 A.2d 861, 863 (1964);
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Yingling, 148 Md. 169, 176-77, 129 A. 36, 39 (1925); W. PROSSER,
supra note 19, § 56.
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unwarranted,"°5 burden to inspect for safety for the remainder of the
project. "
It is thus apparent that the public policy objective of promoting job
safety is not furthered by imposing liability for construction site
accidents on the design professional. Suit brought by workers against
architects and engineers may be seen, then, to be motivated solely by "a
105. It should be noted that the expertise that the architect or engineer brings to the
construction site does not necessarily make him the best qualified person to supervise for
unsafe practices and conditions. The professional is the expert in design but may have
little or no practical knowledge regarding methods and means of construction. On the
other hand, the contractor may not be a licensed professional but may be far more
knowledgeable in dealing with the details of construction, such as the best way to shore a
trench or raise a steel bar, than is a designer. The court alluded to this consideration in
Krieger:
Some mathematics instructors have been heard to observe that there is more than one
solution to a given problem and thus they are unable to say that any given method of
solving a problem is the only correct solution, being able only to determine that the
correct answer is produced. The same reasoning would apply to methods of
construction. One skilled contractor may prefer one method for performing a given
task while another such contractor may choose what seems to him a simpler, less
expensive way of reaching the same end result, either of which procedures would be a
proper method. It could well be, however, that one method might not have occurred to
an engineer or another contractor.
282 Md. at 60, 382 A.2d at 1079. Accord, Allen, Liability of Architects and Engineers to
Third Parties, 22 ARK. L. REV. 454, 462 (1968):
Courts have revealed a tendency to hold the architect liable for all injuries during
construction. What is often overlooked is that the contractor and the architect have
different expertise and that their liabilities should be considered in light of their
respective fields of knowledge. Although they work together toward a common goal,
their responsibilities are not inextricably bound together. The architect should not be
made a safety engineer over the entire job, charged with the responsibility of seeing
that all who are lawfully present are protected from harm.
106. The legal problems encountered by architects and engineers at the construction
site are not limited to personal injury claims. Increasingly, contractors and subcontractors
are filing actions against design professionals claiming economic losses due to delays,
extra costs, or interference in contractual relations during construction. In 1960 the
annual claim frequency against design professionals was 12.5 claims per 100 firms. By
1976 the frequency had more than doubled, to 29.6 claims per 100 firms. VICTOR 0.
SCHINNERER & Co., OFFICE FOR PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY RESEARCH, 7 DESIGN PROFESSIONALI
LIABILITY CLAIMS, no. 6 (1976). Although some courts have refused to permit such actions
because of lack of privity, see, e.g., Blecick v. School Dist., 2 Ariz. App. 115, 406 P.2d 750
(1965), a growing number have found design professionals liable. See Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d
249 (1975).
The possibility of claims such as this, plus liability for worker safety, can create a
dilemma for architects and engineers. Should the design professional require the
contractor to use an alternative method because of concern regarding job safety, he runs
the risk of interfering with the contractor's means and techniques, thereby exposing both
himself and the owner to claims for extra costs of delay. If the design professional does not
require alternative methods and an accident occurs, he may be liable to construction
workers for injuries sustained.
LIABILITY OF ARCHITECTS
desire for 'deeper pockets' to supply compensation for the injuries
sustained."'' 1 Although injured construction workers cannot be blamed
for seeking any possible legal remedy that may make them whole, no
remedy should lie with individuals not at fault and not responsible for
worker safety. Still, the refusal to impose liability on design profession-
als leaves the worker in much the same position as he was prior to
Erhart v. Hummonds:°8 undercompensated by workmen's compensation
and unable to bring suit against entities directly responsible for his
injuries.
CONCLUSION
Krieger and similar cases' °9 signal a return to a realistic appraisal of
the design professional's function and legal responsibility during the
construction project. Like Maryland, other jurisdictions have refused to
impose liability upon the designer"' by judicial fiat. The duty to conduct
safety inspections has returned to the construction team - where it
belongs.
The return swing of the pendulum regarding the liability of design
professionals may, however, eventually operate to mitigate the problems
of injured construction workers. Certainly the argument for revision of
workmen's compensation legislation, and in particular the benefits paid
under those laws, is strengthened by the current trend to deny the
liability of architects and engineers for construction site accidents. Since
the deficiencies in such relief are what prompted suits against design
professionals in the first place,"' legislative action is imperative.
107. 282 Md. at 52, 382 A.2d at 1070 (quoting Cutlip v. Lucky Stores, 22 Md. App. 673,
675, 325 A.2d 432, 434 (1974)),
108. 232 Ark. 133, 334 S.W.2d 869 (1960). See text accompanying notes 24 to 37 supra.
109. Moundsview Ind. School Dist. No. 621 v. Buetow & Assoc., 253 N.W.2d 836, 839
(Minn. 1977); Brown v. Gamble Constr. Co., 537 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Mo. App. 1976).
110. See, e.g., Wheeler & Lewis v. Slifer, 577 P.2d 1092 (Colo. 1978); Luterbach v.
Mochon, Schutte, Hackworthy & Juerisson, Inc., 84 Wis. 2d 1, 267 N.W.2d 13 (1978).
111. See Note, supra note 6, at 1095-96.
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